Investing in Peace : Foreign Direct Investment as Economic Restoration in Sierra Leone? by Millar, Gearoid Michael









In Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice literature economic restoration is considered central to sustainable peace in post-conflict societies. However, it is also widely recognized that many post-conflict states cannot afford mechanisms to provide restoration. Not only are many such states poor to begin with, but violent conflict further degrades their economic capacity. As a result, in their need to provide jobs, generate tax revenues, spur development, and promote sustainable peace, many post-conflict states turn to alternative processes of economic restoration. This paper examines the potential for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to serve as one alternative means by which to provide economic restoration in post-conflict states. Presenting findings from 6 months of fieldwork evaluating one such project in rural Sierra Leone, this paper describes how local people experience such projects and explores whether employment and land-lease payments can provide experiences of economic restoration so far unforthcoming from the state. 
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Introduction
Many recent studies have noted the failure of the usual Transitional Justice (TJ) and Peacebuilding (PB) mechanisms to provide experiences of restoration for individuals and communities who remain living in difficult economic conditions after transitions to democracy and peace.1 In the case of Sierra Leone both Shaw and Millar have argued that post-conflict interventions failed to fully provide for post-conflict restoration. Shaw described how “the quiet violence of socioeconomic marginalization” ... “has continued unabated since the war ended in 2002,”2 while Millar argues that local people required “a new social, economic, and political order in which social services and individual opportunities for advancement are provided”.3  Both call for a more economically restorative approach that responds to the socioeconomic needs of individuals and communities in the post-conflict context, but within a state that is simply unable to muster the necessary resources to support such processes. This paper asks, in cases such as this, where states fail to provide for economic restoration during post-conflict transition, can Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) projects play that role? 
Many TJ scholars have included some form of direct economic restoration in their conceptions of what is required and what would constitute justice in transitional post-conflict states; usually conceived as  reparations4 or victim-oriented restoration.5 What is common among such scholars is the recognition that some form of economic restoration is necessary to “repair the injustice, to make up for it”6 and “to empower individuals and communities to take control of their own lives”.7  However, these direct forms of economic restoration are recognized to be highly problematic, if not impossible. Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza note a long list of potential problems with economic reparations in weak post-conflict situations, including a state of disarray, a lack of money, destructive patterns of patronage, a lack of administrative capacity, ongoing state corruption, and the limited and potentially only short-term interest of foreign actors,8 while Theidon questioned how the potential beneficiaries of economic justice will be identified from among the general population; i.e. who will benefit?9
It is for this reason that many TJ scholars have recognized also the need for less direct – or more systemic – means of economic restoration, such as Mani’s approach to distributional justice,10 or what Duthie identifies as the relationship between TJ and post-conflict development.11 This trend is even more common in the PB literature, where  scholars have long promoted market liberalization, land privatization, foreign investment, and export diversification in order to stabilize the post-conflict peace; particularly in settings where conflict has been driven or facilitated by economic factors, such as in the case of Sierra Leone (Keen 2005; Ballentine & Sherman 2003: 10; Fanthorpe 2001; Peters & Richards 1998).12 In short, it has long been a central pillar of conventional approaches to PB that promoting a sustainable peace includes substantial economic restoration (Paris 2004).13
Large-scale FDI is, therefore, only one of various mechanisms thought to promote economic restoration in post-conflict states, but FDI is of particular interest because it has become increasingly common in recent years, encouraged by the liberal peacebuilding model constructed on the “cornerstones of democratization, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalized markets, and neoliberal development.”14 FDI has been further spurred by a decade of unstable food and fuel prices, changing patterns of consumption throughout the developing world, and the uncertainties of climate change,15 the result of which has been a massive increase in large-scale land investment projects in many post-conflict states over the past ten years, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.16 Such projects are thought to increase the tax revenues of the state, increase employment opportunities for local people, and contribute to stability and growth; dynamics that should contribute to experiences of restoration in a case such as Sierra Leone. However, while the increasing prevalence of such projects is broadly acknowledged, scholars also note that few studies have provided substantive analysis of their impact on the ground.17
 Hence, the question this paper seeks to answer is; when the state fails to provide economic restoration, can large-scale FDI projects which provide skills training, employment opportunities, tax revenues, and land-lease payments serve the same function. The data presented here was collected during 6 months of fieldwork in rural Sierra Leone, between April and September of 2012, observing the operations of one such project and interviewing 55 individuals in 12 villages within the project’s land-lease area. This particular FDI project has leased 40,000 hectares of land, pays local land-owning families $3.20 per acre per year, employs hundreds of local workers, and claims to both contribute US$3 million to the local economy annually and have beneficial effects on education, healthcare, the environment, household incomes, and food security. During this research one of my primary concerns was whether such benefits can assist local individuals to find jobs, to send their children to school, to feel empowered, and to rebuild their lives. In short, I tried to determine if the FDI project was providing the restorative experiences the government of Sierra Leone has so clearly failed to provide.

The Value of Restoration
The necessity of economic restoration is widely acknowledged in scholarship dealing with the challenges of TJ and PB. Within the TJ literature this is thought to be most directly addressed through direct reparations. As argued by Freeman, “the obligation to provide restitution and compensation for serious human rights violations corresponds to the right to reparation,”18 while for Teitel “[t]ransitional reparatory practices enable recognition of individual rights violations and ensuing harm, as well as of public, governmental wrongdoing.”19 As a result, “[t]he liberal case for reparations is justified in the recognition and protection of individual rights”.20 The responsibility to provide restoration has further been enforced with its incorporation into the operation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the form of the Victims Trust Fund,21 which is empowered to provide reparations independent of or complementary too those provided from other sources, such as the state.22 It is therefore recognized both in TJ scholarship and international TJ institutions that states have a responsibility to provide economic restoration to victims of wartime violations. 
To this end at least 26 countries have carried out some form of reparations program, wherein the state either made monetary payments or “restored property, jobs, and pensions, as well as provided special health, education, and housing benefits and preferential access to other social services;”23 these include cash payments made in the cases of Peru,24 Morocco,25 and South Africa.26 These processes are thought to provide direct economic restoration to foster positive and peace-promoting local experiences; often glossed in the TJ literature as “dignity.” In such cases, reparations are thought to “reaffirm the dignity of victims, offering hope for the future despite the loss of loved ones”,27 and to “provide one of the most tangible manifestations of a government’s recognition of victim’s dignity and rights, and of its commitment not to repeat past wrongs”.28 
This dovetails with the dominant approach in the PB literature, wherein it has long been recognized that economic dynamics at both the macro and the micro level can promote conflict and hinder peace.29 As a result, new economic policies and reforms in the post-conflict period are seen as necessary in order to incentivize peace promoting as opposed to conflict promoting choices on the part of actors on the ground.30 Bellantine has argued that such polices are necessary – on the macro level – to promote “longer-term strategies of economic diversification and poverty reduction”,31 while in the case of Sierra Leone specifically Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand argued, in the immediate aftermath of the war, that greater emphasis should have been placed on “job creation and institution building” within a more bottom-up as opposed to centrally planned economic policy.32 As the recent Ebola Crisis has made clear to the world, however, such policies were not adopted and poverty and marginalization continue unabated in post-conflict Sierra Leone today; the economic benefits of a decade of peace have not really been felt by the population at large and this lack of restoration is now recognized as a real threat to peace and stability in the region. 
Further, these dynamics mirror those which have repeatedly been cited as the primary causes of the war in Sierra Leone, in that the failure of the state to provide opportunities for the youth of the country, combined with the imposition of power within the traditional patron-client system throughout the 1970s and 80s, resulted in alienation, disenfranchisement and, eventually, revolution.33 And this highlights more clearly why economic restoration is so necessary even now 13 years after the end of the war. As Duthie has recently argued, “[t]ransitions often take years or decades; socioeconomic development, in particular, generally takes generations if it is achieved to any significant degree.”34 This extended conception of TJ is echoed in recent publications that discuss a post-transitional justice tackling challenges of justice 30 years after an initial transition, and in debates regarding the role of TJ as delayed or intergenerational justice.35 In short, and as Horovitz has argued, for TJ “to have a sustainable effect, attention must be given to fighting poverty and encouraging development,”36 which, as is relatively simple to understand, can itself take decades. As a result, the economic restoration we are discussing here must be considered important not only in the immediate post-conflict moment, but over a more extended transitional period.
However, as noted above, in Sierra Leone the state has been unable to provide any form of economic restoration to the vast majority of victims over the past 13 years. This is particularly so for individuals and communities in isolated and traditionally marginalized rural areas such as in the north of Sierra Leone,37 and it is within this context that alternative mechanisms for providing such opportunities must be considered. Indeed, it has long been recognized that the goal of the Sierra Leonean government has been to increase stability and security by attracting FDI,38 perhaps best exemplified by Castañeda’s finding that the government of Sierra Leone itself has an economic understanding of security and so adopts economic solutions to perceived security threats.39 As such, it is clear that the government itself sees the attraction of FDI and the projects investors conduct to be central to long-term peace; the state itself is relying on investment led restoration and stability. 
As a result, scholars and practitioners must try to evaluate whether experiences of restoration may arise in response not only to the usual TJ and PB mechanisms promoted by the international community, but in response to previously unconsidered alternatives – such as FDI projects – to which impoverished governments are increasingly turning. Particularly in cases such as Sierra Leone, where so much research has indicated the failure of TJ and PB mechanisms such as the TRC to provide local experiences of justice, reconciliation, healing and restoration,40 we must closely examine the local impacts and experiences of these alternative processes and whether they can provide much demanded opportunities for income, employment, and economic restoration. 

The Project, Research Questions, and Methodology
The Bio-energy project investigated here has leased 40,000 hectares of land and the plan current during my fieldwork in 2012 was to plant 10,000 hectares of this land with sugar cane in circular fields called “pivots.” This sugar cane will then be processed into ethanol and exported to European. Between 25,000 and 30,000 people will continue to live in approximately 90 villages interspersed in and around these pivots and, while no villages are being relocated, a great amount of village farmland has been acquired and repurposed by the project. Hence, while the project will clearly have huge impacts on the local setting, it plans to provide compensatory benefits to affected individuals and communities.
	First, the project claims it will provide about 2000 permanent jobs for local workers and the salaries paid for these jobs will make up approximately 65% of the US$3 million annually that the company claims it will pump into the local economy. Such an influx of cash represents approximately US$100 per person per year, which is a significant contribution in a country which the UN reported on their Sierra Leone country profile website as having an estimated GDP per capita of just $725 in 2012. Second, the company is providing payments to local land-owning families for the use of the land. It is paying US$5.00 per acre annually, US$1.80 of which is divided between the local chiefdom, the district council, and the central government in Freetown, while US$3.20 is paid to land-owning families. In some cases families reported leasing as much as 1000 acres to the company, which would mean annual payments of US$3,200; a significant amount of money in rural Sierra Leone. 
It is for these reasons that the company claims that the project will result in sustainable improvements within the project area, thus contributing to economic development and to post-conflict restoration in the country. My primary research questions during my six months of fieldwork were quite simple; what is this company doing on the ground and how are local people experiencing the project? However, as I follow a grounded theory approach to research,41 additional questions emerged during my time in the field. For example, sub-questions most pertinent for this paper included; how much of the money from the project is being spent in local villages? How are these new resources being distributed or shared – between and within villages, families, genders, and generations? Are the salaries provided by the company enough to provide for a family? And can these economic resources contribute to local restoration and experiences of justice and sustainable peace?  
As the project is being implemented over the course of four years between 2010 and 2014, villages in five different “phases” had varying levels of engagement with the process at the time of my interviews in the summer of 2012. Phase 1 villages had experienced the project since 2010 and seen most of what it will do; including employment, payments, land clearing, planting, and harvesting. Phase 2 villages had seen the land cleared, the pivots and roads constructed, and the first sugar-cane planted, but were still watching the process unfold. Phase 3 villages had only recently received their first payments and seen some land clearance and road construction. Phase 4 villages were still going through the land-lease process and had yet to finalize their agreements with the company, receive any payments, or see any work. Lastly, phase five villages were almost completely unaffected by the project as this large piece of the land-lease area was so far unplanned. I sampled two villages randomly from each phase of the project, which allowed me to control for the extent of interaction with and the objective experience of the project’s processes. In addition, I conducted interviews in two addition villages in unique positions vis-á-vis the project, which were, as such, of particular interest. 
All told I conducted 55 interviews in 12 villages. In each I sampled both women and men across age groups. In the end 26 were women while 29 were men and the youngest interviewee was 16 while the eldest was 81. The vast majority of interviewees were farmers, a handful of the men were employed by the project, and a handful of both women and men were petty traders. Only two of my interviewees spoke English, another two spoke Krio (the linqua franca in Sierra Leone) and the majority (51) spoke Temne. All of the 55 interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewee, transcribed by a trusted research assistant in country (which amounted to almost 1500 pages of typed transcripts), and analyzed using Atlas.ti on my return to Europe. The resulting data provides incredible insight into the local effects and experiences of this project. What is presented here is an evaluation of the local experiences of the economic contributions of the project and their potentially restorative effects.

The Promise of Restoration
From the perspective of many academics working in TJ and PB it may seem strange to consider a large agricultural FDI project as a mechanism of post-conflict restoration because of the prevalent critique of such FDI projects as “land-grabs” and as detrimental to local rights to land, food, and livelihoods.42 But in a country that has failed – for quite understandable but nonetheless disheartening reasons – to rehabilitate its educational, healthcare and social services, as well as to provide sufficient economic and employment opportunities, it is necessary to consider the restorative potential of other options. And indeed, based on the data I collected in 2012, it is clear that many people have placed great hope in the economic contributions of the project to provide exactly those services usually considered the responsibility of the state. 
For example, among those villages which, in the summer of 2012, had not yet experienced much of the project’s process (phase 5 villages) there was great hope that the project would have positive economic effects. Some, such as 38 year old John, married with two wives and nine children, thought that the project would provide him with extra income; “although my father is no more” he said “where he owns is where I hold now. I should get my own share.” While Fatu, a 44 year old mother of 6 in the same village, told us that:
“They promise that when they come ... the ones they meet here, they will employ them first in the job. So we know that if they employ my husband in the job … we all are happy for that.”
In the other phase 5 village a 41 year old man named Foray, married with three wives and 8 children, told us that he would “get no money for the land” because he was not a landowner, “but if they come they will pay for my plantation,” meaning they would compensate him for the destruction of his palm trees. When I asked if he thought this compensation would be sufficient he stated “yes, I think so, even though I don’t know the amount.” In a third village, this one in phase 4, we asked a retired farmer name Pa Burehma, 79 years old, married with one wife and father to 11 children, if he wanted the company to come, he responded:
“Yes, because ... we have seen the areas where they have worked. There are people who are unable to build a house [before], but now because of the intervention of [the company] they can now build a house.” 
To these people, who have not yet experienced the operations of the project, the company held out the hope of a restored Sierra Leone; of jobs, opportunities, and economic development.
	This is reflected also in the belief, among local women, that the project would bring benefits for their children and for a life free of the hardships of farming. Tutu, 25 and married with one child and living in a phase 3 village, was a petty trader. When I asked her if she would like her child to be a farmer or to work for the project when he grows up, she responded; “there is nobody who wants poverty. If [the company] only pleases us well before he holds a hoe, because this hoe makes us get old earlier.” Many other women voiced a desire for their children to escape these small villages, to go to a town where there are “fine things,” and to receive an education; something they felt the company could provide. Pa Issa Conteh, the head man in one of the phase 1 villages, reported that the company said that “they will come and relieve us from the hardship,” while Fobi, a 65 year old mother of 13 in the other phase 1 village told us that “they made these promises because we never knew them before .... That is why they promise us and they meet us in hardship.” A number of people paraphrased a parable which equated the company with a child in development; as taking now, but providing in the future. Alima, a 35 year old mother of six, told us that:
 “They that are come, they said their work is like a kid … So their work as it is going, that is how they have to increase. So, if you put somebody on your land, and you see improvement [for them], you should think that he has to help you for something.” 
	In this way, we can see that the people on the ground placed great hope in the project, believing that it would raise them out of hardship. This is partly because the company made subtle promises regarding schools, clinics, and jobs to the various villages, but it is also related to the cultural norms in the setting, where patrons – those with resources and access to power – are responsible for providing to clients the means to survive.43 It is within this cultural setting that local people expect the project to provide for them. Even if it had never made promises, it is the role of the powerful to provide for the powerless, and so local people ask themselves, how could these rich white people not see the poverty of local communities and provide help? As expressed by Anthony, a 32 year old man in one of the phase 1 villages, married with one wife and three children; 
“I just think that if you give your money to develop somewhere and you see nothing has been done, there is a need ... if they report and see no improvement they [are] supposed to do that. If we are short something, let them do it for us.”
Adumu, a 65 year old in a phase 3 village, similarly stated; “if somebody has a land, and they [the company] take it, they should help you, a help that will make you happy,” while Carlimu, a 35 year old farmer and father of three in a phase 5 village stated, “you will not just meet somebody in his land and just pull him out [if] you have nothing to do for him.” 
As a result, many of these people saw themselves as dependent on the company, as clients of this new patron. As argued by a 30 year old farmer named Lamin, a married man with one wife and three children in a phase 5 village; “we sit and we are waiting, it is them we are looking out for.” Or as more simply stated by Fobi, already cited above, “we are under them, because they are educated and they bring the job to us.” Local people felt themselves to be languishing in poverty and hardship, and they believed that the company would assist them; that it would bring resources and distribute them among those in need. During my research, and echoing previous work in Sierra Leone, I heard constantly that people can only “bear up” and are waiting for assistance.44 These people hope that the project will provide them with opportunities for education and employment and for the economic means to rebuild their lives. In this way, in the eyes of local individuals and communities, the project is very much analogous to a TJ or PB mechanism designed to provide economic restoration. Unfortunately, the great hopes local people had placed on the project were largely shattered in those villages with longer experiences of the project. I will describe two ways that this is happening.

Unmet Promises and Potential Destabilizing Effects
Insufficient Salaries
First of all, while the company said that it would provide employment for 2000 local people, the evidence indicates that the jobs available to local people in the villages within the land-lease area generally provided less in the form of salary than the value of the food and resources they previously produced for themselves as subsistence farmers. Among the employees, wives of employees, or parents of employees we spoke to, almost everyone reported salaries for local workers of between 300,000 and 350,000 Leones (Le) per month, which in the summer of 2012 was between US$68 and US$80. These jobs were full time (described as between 10-12 hours per day), and some involved heavy labour, such as the positions clearing fields or harvesting sugar cane. Hence, as I will show below, employment with the company primarily involved difficult and painful labour, much like subsistence farming, but with salaries that cannot pay for the costs of living. 
It is necessary to remember that those who are employed are also primarily the most productive residents of villages. These are not the elders or the children, but adults in their most productive years. In addition, many of those employed are responsible for families which can number ten or fifteen people. When I asked individuals in the villages if 350,000 Le was enough to feed their family they were often at first confused, having rarely considered the cost of living in market terms. Subsistence farmers have little reason to consider how much their food costs per meal, per day, per week, or per month. But when I explored this with them, asking a series of questions about how much a single meal costs for the family when you add together the costs of all the ingredients, and then multiply this for two meals a day, and then multiply this cost by 30, most of the interviewees were shocked. When we would figure out the cost of food for the family interviewees would come to the realization that for food alone their family requires approximately 800,000 Le, or US$185 per month, and this was before any consideration of clothing, education, health, or housing. 
Most then recognized that the money they received from working for the company could not equal the value of the food they could produce by farming for themselves. When asked about this, Danda, a 28 year old father of three working with the company as a security guard at a water pumping station and living in a phase 1 village, said that he tries to supplement his income by fishing; “I go to the water and do fishing ... I catch fish and I can sell 25,000, 30,000, 40,000” he said. But when asked if this could replace what he had lost when he leased his land to the company he simply said “it will not be enough,” and repeated, after a doleful pause, “not be enough.” Pa Rok, an elder in the other phase 1 village, a senior man with three wives and 17 children, made a cogent point, noting that:
“if all the income is gathered together, the current income from [the company] is more better. But you cannot gather [save] your income because you have to eat, if you want to marry you use it, for school fees, for health care, and you have your [relatives], our children are there ... even they want money at the end of the day.” 
	This quote highlights one of the key problems; to subsistence farmers a salary seems at first to be additional money. 300,000 Le is more than most people would hold in their hand in a year, whereas food, palm oil, firewood, fish, or basic housing materials are simply taken from the land; they are not monetized. So it is at first very attractive to think of receiving a salary – free of any consideration of its amount – because it is cash in the pocket. Because food has always been something taken from the land it seemed to most of the residents of the villages that they would be employed, receive a salary, and continue to get food easily from the land – the salary was, therefore, initially considered an addition instead of a replacement. Unfortunately, however, this is not possible if the young men and women of working age are employed. Instead, because the company leased the land and said it would hire the local youth, many people stopped farming and – during my fieldwork in 2012 – were relying on company salaries to support themselves and their families; salaries which fall far short of replacing the value of the food previously produced through subsistence agriculture. The mechanism thought to provide economic restoration has instead created substantial dependency.

Distributing Land-Lease Income
The second problem is with the US$3.20 per acre per year that is paid directly to local land-owning families for the lease of their land. 40,000 hectares is just short of 100,000 acres. If compensation was received by local communities for all of this land, the company would pay local land-owning families a total of around US$320,000 per year. Such an injection of cash each year should be a considerable contribution. However, the data collected indicates that this money, while having some positive effects on village life, a) has far fewer positive effects than one might anticipate, and b) is also causing significant problems. 
First of all, most people see very little of this money. The land-lease payments are paid not to individuals who used to work a particular plot of land but to three male heads of household representing the land-owning families of each village. As a result, if a village were to lease, for example, 1000 acres, and therefore receive a payment of US$3,200 per year, or almost Le14 million, this money would be controlled by these three elder males, not by the specific individuals who used to work that land or the community more generally. My interviewees repeatedly described how these few men controlled the money distributed by the company and their lack of influence over such decisions. As 42 year old Alimamy, a trader with 4 wives and 17 children living in a phase 2 village, described;
“They will not give us. They are not able to tell us that every year, ‘this is the amount they pay for the one acre every year or any month or after 10 years’ ... Our elders, our people that are before us ... have not shown us those things.”
67 year old Adama, interviewed in one of the two additional villages, made a similar point when I asked if she could explain where all this money had been spent. As she stated; 
“I am not able to come and talk those things. They sit and do that. I don’t know there ... Well, the moneys, we just hear they say the company pays money. It is in the bank. They have come to take it, we don’t know. They did not go and take it, we don’t know.”
Consistent with cultural norms in Sierra Leone, the younger males and all women were left out of any decisions to do with the land-lease money, and many felt that elder males were sharing the proceeds only among themselves. As reported by Isatu, already quoted above, “our people [the elders] are not able to give us because they are old and they can’t work.”
	However, even in cases where young men did report that they were given a share of this money, by the time it was split up and divided out among large extended families it was of far too little value to have any restorative effects. The higher ranks take larger portions so by the time the cash trickled down to junior members of families it was reported to be very small. As Alima, quoted above, described:
“When they bring the money they will share it there. The ones over there [that family] will have their own, and the ones here [our family] will get their own. So the one that they are going to share among themselves here will be 50,000 for a single person.”
Rambo, an employee of the company who was nervous about being identified and who I therefore allowed to choose his own pseudonym, described the process like this:
“When they are paying those moneys to us, they are of no better use, because when we are many in the family, if they say to share the money, sometimes it is just 50,000 ... and then there is no way we can [get] better things.”  
Again, to clarify what this means, food alone for a full family can cost – when it all must be bought – about Le 800,000 a month, or approximately $185. Le 50,000 was – in the summer of 2012 – approximately US$11.46. This is, generally, the amount of money that individual young male members of land-owning families are receiving annually from the project’s land-lease payments. It could, if stretched, pay for three days-worth of food for an average family. This is hardly going to be experienced as economic empowerment, justice, or restoration.
	In addition, because even this distribution occurs only within the land-owning families, non-landowning families receive absolutely none of this money or, at best, a token share. While some smaller villages are populated by only one land-owning family, other whole villages are populated by ‘strangers’ – people with no claim to the land on which they work. Two of the 10 randomly sampled villages in this study have no resident land-owning families, but are occupied entirely by families who ‘begged’ land from neighbouring villages. The land-owning families of these neighbouring villages therefore have both the power to lease the land to the company and the privilege of controlling the payments for the land. In both of these cases the stranger families receive only a token amount of money. Adamsay, a member of a stranger family in one of these two villages, a 35 year old mother of four, reported that “when they pay them this money, they only give us LE10,000 in our household. Our entire household is 10,000” ($2.29). In another village, Danda, quoted above, says that the land-owners do give to the strangers, but “they give them half-half,” or not very much.
	Of course the result of all this splitting and sharing is that the bulk of the income stays in the hands of the elder land-owning males, who both decide whether or not the company is accepted by the community, and control the economic benefits of the project once it has arrived. They are the only ones with real power to control the fate of the land, as well as those who primarily benefit from the lease.  In short, the predominant experience among most of the local people is not what the company, the government, or the development banks who have funded the project seem to have expect, nor what proponents of FDI driven development and economic restoration would predict. The salaries paid by the project are grossly insufficient to replace the products previously produced by the villagers themselves when conducting subsistence agriculture and the payments provided in exchange for the land are a) very small, b) divided and distributed to the point of having negligible value for most households, c) only provided to some families and not others, and d) controlled by the already privileged elder male land-owners. In short, the potential restorative value of the project has largely been undermined by insufficient remuneration and a misunderstanding of the local dynamics of privilege and power within and among villages. 
	
Conclusion and Recommendations
There is not space in one article to fully explore either the complex social and cultural dynamics that underpin the problems identified here, or the interrelations between those dynamics. In truth, the problems described are much more intricate than they appear and there are many additional concerns with the project that have undermined its potential to provide post-conflict economic restoration. This article, however, highlights both the current dire need for some innovative form of socioeconomic restoration in Sierra Leone, and the challenges facing FDI projects – already increasingly involved in post-conflict African states as a central element of the liberal peace agenda – in their efforts to serve this function by adding substantially to the economic resources of local communities. The case presented here simply illustrates the problems associated with making simplistic assumptions regarding the impact of the resources large FDI projects can mobilize and distribute in such cases. In this particular case the distribution of these resources increased resentment between the youth and the elder males within families and villages, and sparked frustration and anger within local communities against the company itself (particularly among the young men). There is little reason to think that such dynamics will not be mirrored in other similar cases.
Further, it became quite clear during this research that the company was simply unprepared to conduct this project in a way that would foster experiences of restoration for the majority of those living within the project’s land-lease area. For example, I was informed by the manager overseeing the company’s own Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) process that the company believed that salaries and land-lease payments should be supplementary to a family’s farming, and that they did not expect the arrival of the company to stop whole families and villages from farming. They simply failed to foresee the implications of raised hopes in a setting defined by expectations of patron-client relationships, the confusion that their system of land acquisition would engender among an almost uniformly illiterate local population, or the local traditional methods of farming – which require the presence of strong young males at specific times of the year. 
There is little reason to assume that this ignorance regarding local contexts and culture is not echoed in similar projects elsewhere. Indeed, nearly all of the upper management of the company in Sierra Leone were South Africans who had worked in Mozambique or Zimbabwe – a group progressively more engaged in managing capital intensive projects across the region – but to my knowledge none had worked previously in Sierra Leone. Few seemed to understand the local context, some openly expressed a disdain of local practices and a fear of local people, and I regularly heard complaints of racism and abuse among my interviewees who interacted with the project. Indeed, when I asked one non-South African consultant what the company will do if the employees or the young men from the villages express their frustration in violence I was told that the South Africans have a plan for such events; as he stated, the plan is to “always have a car nearby and US$500 and your passport in your pocket.” There seemed, in short, no real concern with developing an economically restorative or socially reparative project; the overriding purpose was profit.
Sadly, this concern with profit as opposed to contributing to economic restoration seemed to override even the concerns of the development banks funding the project; which again warns us to expect similar dynamics within other FDI projects. I was told by the managers of the project within country that I could not study the project directly because I refused to sign an agreement restricting what I publish regarding the impacts of the project. I was told that if I publish anything critical I could be responsible for setting back development in Sierra Leone by 50 years. Further, I was told that the prime goal of the project was to pay back the banks and so the overriding concern was not whether the project was restorative for local people, but that it paid back what it owed. In essence, all of the economic incentives the company was responding to militated against them taking the time to hire more locally knowledgeable or sensitive staff, developing a more informed plan, engaging with and communicate sufficiently with local people, or evaluating whether or not the project as a whole was having restorative effects; all of which are challenges which must be addressed if FDI projects in post-conflict states are to have any economically restorative function. However, such projects are simply not required to address such issues and development banks provide no economic incentives for them to take such concerns seriously.
In short, the findings from this case study seem to indicate that the companies with the resources and personnel to initiate large FDI projects in post-conflict settings are not incentivized to care if their projects contribute to peace or to conflict, to stability or to protest, to post-conflict restoration or to intergroup animosities. It is, therefore, up to others to create such incentives. In this case, and many others like it, it must be recognized that the development banks are primarily to blame and if FDI projects are to play an economically restorative role in post-conflict states it is at the banks where change must occur. If the wave of FDI projects entering post-conflict states are to serve any restorative function, then loan terms for such projects must incentivize not only profitability and loan repayment – which demands control of the local community – but communication and cooperation with the local community; they must incentivize understanding and knowledge of local power dynamics and cultural norms, not the co-optation of local and government elites in service of the project; and they must incentivize sustainable living wages as opposed to sub-subsistence wages. In addition, it is crucial that banks fund independent third party assessment of the environmental, social, and economic effects of these projects. The project studied here was funded to evaluate itself and had no incentive to hire truly independent third-party evaluators. 
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